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Abstract. This article extends Defeasible Logic to deal with the contextual de-
liberation process of cognitive agents. First, we introduce meta-rules to reason
with rules. Meta-rules are rules that have as a consequent rules for motivational
components, such as obligations, intentions and desires. In other words, they in-
clude nested rules. Second, we introduce explicit preferences among rules. They
deal with complex structures where nested rules can be involved.
1 Introduction
Logic is used in agent oriented software engineering not only for specification and ver-
ification, but also for programming deliberation and meta-deliberation tasks. For this
reason, Defeasible Logic (DL) has been extended with, amongst others, rule types, pref-
erences [?], and actions [?,?]. In rule based cognitive agents, for example in defeasible
logic, detailed interactions among cognitive attitudes like beliefs, desires, intentions
and obligations are represented by rules, like the obligation to travel to Paris next week
leading to a desire to travel by train (r1), or by preferences, such that if the desire to
travel by train cannot be met, than there is a desire to travel by plane (p1). Patterns of
such interactions are represented by rule priorities (obligations override desires or in-
tentions – for social agents) [?,?] rule conversions (obligations behave as desires – for
norm internalizing agents) [?], and so on.
As interaction among mental attitudes becomes more complicated, the new chal-
lenge in agent deliberation languages is the coordination of such interactions. For ex-
ample, at one moment an obligation to travel may lead to the desire to travel by train
(r1), whereas at another moment it may lead to a desire to travel by plane (r2). Such
coordination may be expressed by making the context explicit in rules r1 and r2, and
defining when rule r1 has higher priority than rule r2, or it can be defined as a combina-
tion of rule r1 and preference p1 [?].
In this paper we raise the question how, as a further sophistication to coordinate
the interaction among mental attitudes, to define the proof theory of nested rules (see
[?] for a general theory of nested rules, [?] for theory of nested rules with time) and
preferences among rules. Surprisingly, this complex language gives us just the right
expressive power to describe a wide class of interaction phenomena: the rule leading
to desire to travel by train may be preferred to the rule leading to a desire to travel by
plane (r1 is preferred to r2), maybe as a second alternative, or the train rule may even
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be replaced by the plane rule (r1 into r2), maybe due to experienced train delays. The
new language can be used to describe a new class of patterns of the coordination of
interaction, for example when social agents turn into selfish agents, maybe when the
agent does not have sufficient resources. Due to space limitations, we focus only on the
formal aspects of the new logic.
Finally, the definitions of the deliberation logics developed here are much more
complex than the definitions of temporal logics traditionally used in agent based soft-
ware engineering for specification and verification, since they contain rules, prefer-
ences, non-monotonic proof system, and so on. However, whereas these temporal logics
have a relatively high computational complexity, deliberation logics have to be efficient
– with at most linear complexity (in the number of rules). Moreover, interaction patterns
in such temporal logics have focussed on a relatively small class of agent types such as,
for example, realisms and commitment strategies in BDI-CTL [?,?], whereas a much
broader class has been studied in the more expressive deliberation logics.
This paper is organized as follows. We first give some general intuitions of how
the logical system works and define the formal language we use to contextualise the
deliberation of cognitive agents. A running example will help us illustrate the system.
The second step consists in describing the logical machinery for reasoning about con-
textualised agents. This requires to provide proof procedures to derive goals (desires,
intentions, and obligations) as well as to derive rules for proving goals. A further exam-
ple concludes the paper.
2 Contextualising Cognitive Agents
The basic deliberative process uses rules to derive goals (desires, intentions, obliga-
tions) based on existing beliefs, desires, intentions and obligations (beliefs concern the
knowledge an agent has about the world: they are not in themselves motivations for ac-
tion). Contextualising the deliberation requires to provide the agent with a mechanism
for reasoning about rules for goals, which are conditioned to some additional factors.
In the simplest case, this can be done by adding such factors as new antecedents of the
rules to be contextualised. But transformations may be problematic when complex rea-
soning patterns are considered. The framework of this paper is based on the following
assumptions:
Modalities: the system develops a constructive account of the modalities correspond-
ing to mental states and obligations: rules are meant to devise the logical conditions
for introducing them. Modalities may have a different logical behaviour. (Consider
the special role played by belief rules, which here are not contextualised and permit
to derive only unmodalised literals, whereas the other rule types allow for deriving
modalised conclusions.) [?,?,?].
Conversions: possible conversions of a modality into another can be accepted, as when
the applicability of rule leading to derive, for example, OBLp (p is obligatory) may
permit, under appropriate conditions, to obtain INTp (p is intended) [?,?].
Preferences: preferences can be expressed in two ways: using standard DL superiority
relation over rules and the operator ⊗. Operator ⊗ [?] applies to literals [?] as well
as to rules, and captures the idea of violation. A ⊗-sequence such as α ⊗ β ⊗ γ
means that α is preferred, but if α is violated, then β is preferred; if β is violated,
then the third choice is γ .
Meta-rules: meta-rules permit to reason about rules for deriving goals. This is the main
device for contextualising the provability of goals and requires to introduce nested
rules.
We extend the language of Defeasible Logic with the modal operators BEL, INT,
DES and OBL, and the non-classical connective⊗. We divide the rules into meta-rules,
and atomic rules. Atomic rules are in addition divided into rules for beliefs, desires, in-
tentions, and obligations. For X ∈ {C,BEL, INT,DES,OBL}, where {BEL, INT,DES,
OBL} is the set of modalities and C stands for contextual or meta-rules, we have that
φ1, . . . ,φn →X ψ is a strict rule such that whenever the premises φ1, . . . ,φn are indis-
putable so is the conclusion ψ . φ1, . . . ,φn⇒X ψ is a defeasible rule that can be defeated
by contrary evidence. φ1, . . . ,φn ;X ψ is a defeater that is used to defeat some defeasi-
ble rules by producing evidence to the contrary.
Definition 1 (Language). Let PROP be a set of propositional atoms and Lab be a set
of labels.
– The set of modal operators is MOD = {BEL,OBL, INT,DES};
– The set of literals is L = PROP∪{¬p|p ∈ PROP}. If q is a literal, ∼q denotes the
complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p then∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then
∼q is p);
– The set of modal literals is
MLit = {Xl,¬Xl|l ∈ L,X ∈ {DES, INT,OBL}};
– The set of ⊗-expressions is
PREF = {l1⊗·· ·⊗ ln : n≥ 1,{l1, . . . , ln} ⊆ L}.
We also write
⊗n
i=1 li for l1⊗·· ·⊗ ln ∈ Pref.
– The set of labeled atomic rules is Ruleatom = Ruleatom,s∪Ruleatom,d ∪Ruleatom,dft,
where for X ∈MOD
Ruleatom,s = {r : φ1, . . . ,φn→X ψ|r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ L∪MLit,ψ ∈ L}
Ruleatom,d = {r : φ1, . . . ,φn⇒X ψ|r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ L∪MLit,ψ ∈ Pref}
Ruleatom,dft = {r : φ ;X ψ|r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ L∪MLit,ψ ∈ Pref}
– the set of labeled rules is
Rule = Ruleatom∪{¬(r : φ1, . . . ,φnY ψ)|(r : φ1, . . . ,φnY ψ) ∈ Ruleatom,
 ∈ {→,⇒,;},Y ∈ {DES, INT,OBL}}
By convention, if r is a rule,∼r denotes the complementary rule (if r : φ1, . . . ,φnX
ψ then ∼r is ¬(r : φ1, . . . ,φn X ψ); and if r : ¬(r : φ1, . . . ,φn X ψ) then ∼r is
r : φ1, . . . ,φnxψ).
– the set of ⊗-rules is
Q = {a1⊗·· ·⊗an|n≥ 1,{a1, . . . ,an} ⊆ Rule}
– The set of labeled meta-rules is RuleC = RuleCs ∪RuleCd ∪RuleCdft, where, for X ∈
{DES, INT,OBL}
RuleCs = {r : φ →C ψ|r ∈ Lab,φ ⊆ L∪MLit,ψ ∈ RuleX}
RuleCd = {r : φ ⇒C ψ|r ∈ Lab,φ ⊆ L∪MLit,ψ ∈ Q}
RuleCdft = {r : φ ;C ψ|r ∈ Lab,φ ⊆ L∪MLit,ψ ∈ Q}
– We use some abbreviations, such as superscript for mental attitude or meta-rule,
subscript for type of rule, and Rule[φ ] for rules whose consequent is φ , for example:
RuleBEL = {r : φ1, . . . ,φnBELψ|(r : φ1, . . . ,φnBELψ) ∈ Rule, ∈ {→,⇒,;}}
Rules[ψ] = {φ1, . . . ,φn→X ψ|{φ1, . . . ,φn} ⊆ L∪MLit,ψ ∈ L,X ∈MOD}
Other abbreviations are the following. We use r1, . . . ,rn to label (or name) rules,
A(r) to denote the set {φ1, . . . ,φn} of antecedents of the rule r, and C(r) to denote
the consequent ψ of the rule r. For some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that ci = q, R[ci = q]
and rXd [ci = q] denote, respectively, the set of rules and a defeasible rule of type X
with the head ⊗ni=1ci such that ci = q.
A defeasible agent theory consists of a set of facts or indisputable statements, a set
of rules for beliefs, a set of meta-rules, a superiority relation > among rules saying
when one rule may override the conclusion of another rule, and a conversion function
c saying when a rule of one type can be used also as another type. Belief rules are
the reasoning core of the agent. Rules for goals (desires, intentions, and obligations)
are viewed in any theory as meta-rules with an empty antecedent and a consequent
consisting of a ⊗-sequence of rules for goals.
Definition 2 (Contextual Defeasible Agent Theory). A contextual defeasible agent
theory is a structure D = (F,RBEL,RC,>,c) where
– F ⊆ L∪MLit is a finite set of facts,
– RBEL ⊆ RuleBEL,
– RC ⊆ RuleC,
– >⊆ (Rule×Rule)∪ (RC×RC), the superiority relation, is an acyclic binary rela-
tion over the set of rules;
– c⊆MOD×MOD is a set of conversions.
For readability reasons, we sometimes omit arrows for meta-rules r⇒C with the empty
body. That is, a defeasible meta-rule⇒C (p→INT q) is just represented as p→INT q.
This extension of DL makes it possible to express ordered preferences over different
options for contextualising rules for goals. In fact, we may have meta-rules such as the
following:
r : a⇒C (r′ : b⇒OBL c)⊗¬(r′′ : d⇒INT f ⊗g)
Intuitively, meta-rule r states that, under the condition a, we should infer rule r′ stating
that c is obligatory if b is the case; however, if this rule is violated (i.e., if, given b we
obtain ¬c) then the second choice is to derive the negation of rule r′′, which would
imply to intend f , as a first choice, or g as a second choice, if d is the case.
The following running example illustrates the contextual defeasible agent theory.
Example 1. (RUNNING EXAMPLE). Frodo, our Tolkienian agent, intends to be entrusted
by Elrond to be the bearer of the ring of power, a ring forged by the dark lord Sauron.
Frodo has the task to bring the ring to Mordor, the realm of Sauron, and to destroy it
by throwing it into the fires of Mount Doom. Given this task, if Frodo does not destroy
the ring, he is obliged to leave the Middle Earth, while, if his primary intention is not
to destroy it, but he does accomplish the task anyway, he will intend to go back to the
Shire. If Frodo is a brave hobbit, rule r0 should hold, which states the intention to kill
Sauron; however, if r0 is violated, then rule r3 should not hold. On the other hand, if
Frodo is selfish, that he has the intention to be entrusted implies that he has also the
intention to kill Elrond. However, if he has this last intention, he is not obliged destroy
the ring if he is obliged to be the ring bearer. As facts of the theory, we know that Frodo
intends to be entrusted by Elrond, that he is selfish and brave at the same time, and that
he does not kill Sauron.
F = {INTEntrusted,Selfish,Brave,¬KillSauron}
R = {r1 : OBLMordor⇒OBL DestroyRing⊗LeaveMiddleEarth
r2 : INTRingBearer⇒OBL Mordor
r3 : INTRingBearer⇒INT ¬DestroyRing⊗BackToShire
r4 : Entrusted⇒OBL RingBearer
r5 : Brave⇒C (r0 : /0⇒INT KillSauron)⊗
¬(r3 : INTRingBearer⇒INT ¬DestroyRing⊗BackToShire)
r6 : Selfish⇒C (r7 : INTEntrusted→INT KillElrond)
r8 : Selfish, INTKillElrond⇒C (r9 : INTRingBearer⇒OBL ¬DestroyRing)}
>= {r3 > r1,r5 > r8}
c = {c(OBL, INT)}
3 Reasoning about Contextual Deliberation
Let X ∈ {C,BEL,DES, INT,OBL}. Proofs are sequences of literals, modal literals, and
rules together with so-called proof tags +∆ , −∆ , +∂ and −∂ . Given a defeasible agent
theory D, +∆X q means that a conclusion q is provable in D using only facts and strict
rules for X , −∆X q means that it has been proved in D that q is not definitely provable
in D, +∂X q means that q is defeasibly provable in D, and −∂X q means that it has been
proved in D that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
Before presenting proof procedures to derive specific tagged literals and rules in a
contextual agent theory, we need to introduce some auxiliary notions.
Definitions ?? and ?? are propaedeutic for Definition ?? (which defines the set of
meta-rules supporting the derivation of a chosen rule) and Definition ?? (which defines
the maximal-provable sets of rules that are provable in a theory).
Definition 3 (Sub Rule). Let r ∈ Rule be an atomic rule and  ∈ {→,⇒,;}. The set
Sub(r) of sub-rules is defined as follows:
– Sub(r) = {A(r)X ⊗ ji=1ai|C(r) =⊗ni=1ai, j ≤ n}, if r is atomic
– Sub(r) = {¬(A(r)X ⊗ ji=1ai)|C(r) =⊗ni=1ai, j ≤ n}, otherwise
E.g., given r : (a→INT b⊗ c), Sub(r) = {a→INT b,a→INT b⊗ c}.
Definition 4 (Modal Free Rule). Given an atomic rule r, the modal free rule L(r) of r
is obtained by removing all modal operators in A(r).
For example, given r : INTa→INT b, L(r) is r : a→INT b.
Definition 5 (Rule-Supporting Rules). Let D be a contextual agent theory. The set
RC〈rX 〉 of supporting rules in RC for a non-nested rule rX ∈ Rule is:
– if rX ∈ Ruleatom and ∀a ∈ A(r) : a = Xb ∈MLit,
RC〈rX 〉=
⋃
sX ∈Sub(rX )
(
RC[ci = sX ]∪
⋃
Y :c(Y,X)
RC[ci = L(sY )]
)
– otherwise
RC〈rX 〉=
⋃
∀sX ∈Sub(rX )
RC[ci = sX ]
For example, a meta-rule⇒C (a⇒INT b⊗c)⊗(a⇒INT d) supports the following rules:
(a⇒INT b), (a⇒INT b⊗ c), and (a⇒INT d).
Definition 6 (Maximal Provable-Rule-Sets). Let D be a contextual agent theory. The
maximal provable-rule-sets of non-nested rules that are possibly provable in D is, for
X ∈ {DES, INT,OBL},
RPX =
{
Sub(ci)|C(r) =
n⊗
i=1
ci,r ∈ RC
}
∪{
Sub(L(cYi ))|∀Y such that sc(Y,X),C(r) =⊗ni=1cXi ,r ∈ RC, and
∀a ∈ A(r) : a = Xb ∈MLit
}
RPBEL ={Sub(r)|r ∈ RBEL}.
Since we want to derive rules for goals, this requires defining when two rules are in-
compatible. In this regard, notice that defeasible rules and defeaters for goals may have
⊗-expressions as their consequents, which is something we do not have for strict rules.
Accordingly, the notion of incompatibility has to take also into account when two ⊗-
expressions occur in the the heads of two rules.
Definition 7. Two non-nested rules r and r′ are incompatible iff r′ is an incompatible
atomic rule of r or r′ is an incompatible negative rule of r.
1. r′ is an incompatible atomic rule of r iff r and r′ are atomic rules and
– A(r) = A(r′), C(r) =
⊗n
i=1 ai and
– C(r′) =
⊗m
i=1 bi, such that ∃ j, 1≤ j ≤ n,m, a j =∼b j and, ∀ j′ ≤ j, a j′ = b j′ .
2. r′ is an incompatible negative rule of r iff either r or r′ is not an atomic rule and
– A(r) = A(r′), C(r) =
⊗n
i=1 ai and
– C(r′) =
⊗m
i=1 bi, such that N = min{n,m},∀ j ≤ N,a j = b j.
Definition 8. Let D be a contextual agent theory and r a non-nested rule. The set of all
possible incompatible rules for rX is:
IC(rX ) =
{
r′|r′ ∈ RPX , r′ is incompatible with rX}
Definitions ?? and ?? define, respectively, when a literal or a rule is provable (and non-
provable: rejected), and when a rule is applicable (and non-applicable: discarded). Both
notions are used in the proof procedures presented in the remainder.
Definition 9 (Provable). Let # ∈ {∆ ,∂}, P = (P(1), . . . ,P(n)) be a proof in a contex-
tual agent theory D, and X ∈ {DES, INT,OBL}. A literal q ∈ L or a rule r ∈ Rule are
#-provable in P if there is an initial sequence P(1), . . . ,P(m) of P such that either
1. q is a literal and P(m) = +#BELq or
2. q is a modal literal X p and P(m) = +#X p or
3. q is a modal literal ¬X p and P(m) =−#X p or
4. rX is a rule in RPX and P(m) = +#CrX ;
A literal q ∈ L or a rule r ∈ Rule are #-rejected in P if there is an initial sequence
P(1), . . . ,P(m) of P such that either
1. q is a literal and P(m) =−#BELq or
2. q is a modal literal X p and P(m) =−#X p or
3. q is a modal literal ¬X p and P(m) = +#X p or
4. rX is a rule in RPX and P(m) =−#CrX .
Definition 10. Let D be a contextual agent theory. Applicable rules and discarded rules
are defined as follows:
1. A rule r ∈ RBEL∪RC is applicable iff ∀a ∈ A(r):
– if a ∈ L then +∂BELa ∈ P(1..n), and
– if a = Xb ∈MLit then +∂X a ∈ P(1..n).
2. A rule r ∈ R[ci = q] is applicable in the condition for ±∂X iff
– r ∈ RXatom and ∀a ∈ A(r): if a ∈ L then +∂BELa ∈ P(1..n), and
if a = Zb ∈MLit then +∂Za ∈ P(1..n); or
– r ∈ RYatom and c(Y,X) ∈ c and ∀a ∈ A(r): +∂X a ∈ P(1..n).
3. A rule r is discarded in the condition for ±∂X iff either:
– if r ∈ RBEL∪RC ∪RX then either
∃a ∈ A(r) :−∂BELa ∈ P(1..n) or
∃Xb ∈ A(R), Xb ∈MLit and −∂X b ∈ P(1..n); or
– if r ∈ RY , then ∃a ∈ A(r) :−∂X a ∈ P(1..n).
Notice that the notion of applicability needs to take conversions into account.
Remark 1. Conversions affect applicability of rules. In many cases we want that this
possibility can be admitted:
+∆INTGoToRome, GoToRome→BEL GoToItaly |∼+∆INTGoToItaly
+∂INTGoToRome, GoToRome⇒OBL VisitVatican |∼+∂INTVisitVatican
The first rule states that the agent believes that going to Rome strictly implies going
to Italy; if we can derive that the agent has the intention to visit Rome, we have rea-
sons to say that a rational agent may have the intention to visit Italy. The second rule
says that visiting Rome defeasibly implies the obligation to visit Vatican City. With
norm-complying agents, agent’s intention to visit Rome rationally implies to having the
intention to go to Vatican City.
Example 2. Suppose we allow a deontic rule to be converted into a rule for intention,
i.e. c(OBL, INT). Consider rule r : a,b⇒OBL p: if ∂INTa and ∂INTb, then r is applicable
in the proof condition for +∂INT.
Before providing proof procedures to derive rules, let us introduce specific proof tags
for this purpose. Remember that  denotes either→,⇒ or ; to simplify our presen-
tation. ±∆CrX means that rule r ∈ RX is (is not) definitely provable using meta-rules;
±∂CrX means that rule r ∈ RX is (is not) defeasibly provable using meta-rules. In gen-
eral, ±∆XC and ±∂XC mean, respectively, definitive (non-)provability of rules for X ,
and defeasible (non-)provability of rules for X .
Let us see proof procedures to derive rules. In this perspective, however, we have
to be careful, as we can distinguish between strict and defeasible derivations of non-
nested strict and defeasible rules. Given a contextual agent theory D, a non-nested rule
r is strictly provable in D when it is strictly derived using a meta-rule such as a→C r. A
rule r is defeasibly provable in D when it is defeasibly derived using a meta-rule such
as a→C r and a⇒C r. When a strict atomic rule a→INT b is defeasibly derived, it acts
as a defeasible rule a⇒INT b.
Proof procedures for the strict derivation of atomic rules in a contextual defeasible
agent theory D are as follows:
+∆XC : If P(i+1) = +∆Cr
X then
(1) X = BEL and rX ∈ RBEL or
(2) ∃s ∈ RCs 〈rX 〉 ∀a ∈ A(s) a is ∆ -provable.
−∆XC : If P(i+1) =−∆CrX then
(1) X 6= BEL or rX 6∈ RBEL and
(2) ∀s ∈ RCs 〈rX 〉 ∃a ∈ A(r) : a is ∆ -rejected.
Strict derivations of rules are based on the following intuition. If the rule r we want
to derive is for belief, r must be in the set of belief rules of the theory. Otherwise (for
the other rule types), r must be proved using a strict meta-rule whose antecedents are
strictly provable. Defeasible derivations of rules are based on the following procedures.
+∂XC : If P(n+1) = +∂Cr
X , then
(1) +∆CrX ∈ P(1..n), or
(2) (1) ∀r′′ ∈ IC(rX ), ∀r′ ∈ RCs 〈r′′〉, r′ is discarded and
(2) ∃t ∈ RC〈ci = rX 〉 such that
(1) ∀i′ < i, ci′ is applicable,
(2) ∀i′ < i, C(ci′) =
⊗n
k=1 bk, such that ∀k : +∂BEL∼bk ∈ P(1..n),
(3) t is applicable, and
(3) ∀r′′ ∈ IC(rX ),∀s ∈ RC〈di = r′′〉
(1) if ∀i′ < i, di′ is applicable, C(di′) =
⊗n
k=1 ak s.t. ∀k : +∂BEL∼ak ∈ P(1..n), then
(1) s is discarded, or
(2) ∃z ∈ RC〈pi = r′′′〉: r′′′ ∈ IC(C(s)) s.t. ∀i′ < i, pi′ is applicable, and
C(pi′) =
⊗n
k=1 dk s.t. ∀k : +∂BEL∼dk ∈ P(1..n) and z is applicable and z > s.
−∂XC : If P(n+1) =−∂CrX , then
(1) −∆CrX ∈ P(1..n), and
(2) (1) ∃r′ ∈ RCs 〈r′′〉 such that r′′ ∈ IC(rX ), r′ is applicable or
(2) ∀t ∈ RC〈ci = rX 〉
(1) ∃i′ < i such that ci′ is discarded, or
(2) ∃i′ < i such C(ci′) =
⊗n
k=1 bk and ∃k :−∂BEL∼bk ∈ P(1..n),
(3) t is discarded, or
(3) ∃s ∈ RC〈di = r′′〉 such that ∀r′′ ∈ IC(rX ), such that
(1) ∀i′ < i, di′ is applicable, C(di′) =
⊗n
k=1 ak s.t. ∀k : +∂BEL∼ak ∈ P(1..n), and
(1) s is applicable, and
(2) ∀z ∈ RC〈pi = r′′′〉 such that r′′′ ∈ IC(C(s)) ∃i′ < i, pi′ is discarded or
C(pi′) =
⊗n
k=1 dk s.t. ∃k :−∂BEL∼dk ∈ P(1..n) or z is discarded or z 6> s.
Remark 2. The defeasible proof of a rule runs in three phases. We have to find an ar-
gument in favour of the rule we want to prove. Second, all counter-arguments are ex-
amined (rules for the opposite conclusion). Third, all the counter-arguments have to
be rebutted (the counter-argument is weaker than the pro-argument) or undercut (some
of the premises of the counter-argument are not provable). Let us exemplify positive
proof conditions (+∂XC ) step by step. Suppose we want to derive r : INTa→INT b,
namely, that X = INT and  =→. We have the following options. Condition (1): r is
definitely provable; or, Condition (2): We use a strict or defeasible meta-rule to derive
r. This must exclude, as a precondition, that any rule, which is incompatible with r, is
definitely supported: (condition 2.1). That is, rules such as
r′ : ¬(INTa→INT b) r′′ : INTa→INT ¬b r′′′ : a→OBL ¬b
should not be supported, if we have that r (the rule we want to prove) is applicable,
+∂INTa and c(OBL, INT), namely, if we may convert a rule for obligation into one for
intention. In fact, if we have this conversion, r′′ behaves like a rule for intention. With
this done, condition (2.2) states that there should exist a meta-rule such as
t : d⇒C (w : p⇒OBL q)⊗ (r : INTa→INT b)
such that t is applicable, +∂BELd, and the first choice, rule w, is violated, namely that
+∂BEL p and +∂BEL¬q. But this fact must exclude that any meta-rule s supporting an
incompatible conclusion against r is applicable (see condition 2.3.1.1). Alternatively, if
s is applicable, we have to verify that there exists a meta-rule z supporting r such that z
is applicable and is stronger that s (see condition 2.3.1.2). Notice that when we say that
that a meta-rule supports a rule, we take into account that meta-rules may have ⊗-rules
in their consequents. For example, if s is as follows
s : d⇒C (w : b→DES c)⊗ r′ : ¬(INTa→INT b),
but we prove −∂BEL¬c, this means that w cannot be violated and so s cannot be used to
attack the derivation of r: in this case, using s, we could only prove rule w.
Given the above proof conditions for deriving rules, the following are the procedures
for proving literals. Notice that each time a rule r is used and applied, we are required
to check that r is provable.
+∆X : If P(i+1) = +∆X q then
(1) Xq ∈ F , or q ∈ F if X = BEL, or
(2) ∃r ∈ RuleXs [q] : +∆Cr and ∀a ∈ A(r) a is ∆ -provable or
(3) ∃r ∈ RuleYs [q] : +∆Cr, ∀a ∈ A(r) a is ∆ -provable and c(Y,X).
−∆X : If P(i+1) =−∆X q then
(1) Xq /∈ F , or q /∈ F if X = BEL, and
(2) ∀r ∈ RuleXs [q] :−∆Cr or ∃a ∈ A(r) : a is ∆ -rejected and
(3) ∀r ∈ RuleYs [q] :−∆Cr, or if c(Y,X) then ∃a ∈ A(r) a is ∆ -rejected.
+∂X : If P(n+1) = +∂X q then
(1)+∆X q ∈ P(1..n) or
(2) (1) −∆X∼q ∈ P(1..n) and
(2) ∃r ∈ Rulesd [ci = q] such that +∂Cr, r is applicable, and
∀i′ < i, +∂BEL∼ci′ ∈ P(1..n); and
(3) ∀s ∈ Rule[c j =∼q], either −∂Cs, or s is discarded, or
∃ j′ < j such that −∂BEL∼c j′ ∈ P(1..n), or
(1) ∃t ∈ Rule[ck = q] such that +∂Ct, t is applicable and
∀k′ < k, +∂BEL∼ck′ ∈ P(1..n) and t > s.
−∂X : If P(n+1) =−∂X q then
(1)−∆X q ∈ P(1..n) and either
(2) (1) +∆X∼q ∈ P(1..n) or
(2) ∀r ∈ Rulesd [ci = q], either −∂Cr, or r is discarded or
∃i′ < i such that −∂BEL∼ci′ ∈ P(1..n); or
(3) ∃s ∈ Rule[c j =∼q] such that +∂Cs, s is applicable and
∀ j′ < j, +∂BEL∼c j′ ∈ P(1..n), and
(1) ∀t ∈ Rule[ck = q] either −∂Ct, or t is discarded, or
∃k′ < k such that −∂BEL∼ck′ ∈ P(1..n) or t 6> s.
Example 3. (RUNNING EXAMPLE, CONTINUED). The fact that Frodo has the intention
to be entrusted by Elrond makes it possible to derive +∆INTEntrusted. Since we have
the conversion c(OBL, INT), this would make both r2 and r3 applicable. However, r5
and r6, too, are applicable. Rule r6 permits to derive r7, which is applicable, as Frodo
has the intention to be entrusted. This allows in turn for the derivation of the intention
to kill Elrond, which makes r8 applicable. Here we have a conflict between r5 and r8,
but the former is stronger. On the other hand, r5 states, as a first choice, that Frodo
has the intention to kill Sauron. But this intention is violated, as ¬KillSauron is a fact,
which makes it possible to derive +∆BEL¬KillSauron and so +∂BEL¬KillSauron. Thus
we have to derive the second choice, namely, the negation of r3. In this way, even if r3
is stronger than r1, the applicability of meta-rule r5 makes r3 inapplicable.
4 Context-Detection: A Further Example
Context can play as a disambiguating function in agent communication. For example,
when an agent A receives a command “On” from another agent B, the meaning of
the message usually depends on the common context between the two agents. Without
context information, the command “On” is too ambiguous because “On” could mean
many things, for example, turn on a water tap, turn on a light, turn on a projector, or run
a weekly meeting presentation.
To show how contexts can be detected and decisions can be made using contextual
information within our reasoning model, we consider a simple theory representing an
office assistant that can help office workers to control their modernized office environ-
ment for non-interrupted work flow:
F = {MRoom,Monday,Morning,onPro jector}
RBEL = {r1 : MRoom,Monday,Morning⇒BEL CWMeeting
r2 : MRoom,Monday,Morning⇒BEL ¬CDMeeting
r3 : MRoom,Morning⇒BEL CDMeeting
r4 : onPro jector→BEL ¬trunOnPro jector}
RC = {r5 : CWMeeting⇒C (MessageOn⇒INT turnOnPro jector⊗
openWMPresentation⊗openDMPresentation)
r6 : CDMeeting⇒C (MessageOn⇒INT turnOnPro jector⊗
openDMPresentation⊗openWMPresentation)}
Herein, rules r1 and r2 say that if the assistant agent is in a meeting room (MRoom) and it
is Monday morning, then usually the context is that of a weekly meeting (CWMeeting)
and not of a daily meeting (CDMeeting). However, rule r3 says that if the assistant agent
is in a meeting room in the morning, then the context is usually that of a daily meeting.
That is, r1, r2, and r3 are used to detect the context. Once the context is determined, the
assistant agent can properly process the command “On”. For instance, r5 says that if it
is a weekly meeting, enable the following rule:
MessageOn⇒INT trunOnPro jector⊗openWMPresentation⊗openDMPresentation
meaning that, if the agent receives a command “On”, then the agent usually should
form the intention to turn on the data projector, but if it cannot be turned on (because
it is already turned on), then it should try to open a weekly meeting presentation file.
However, for some reason, if the weekly meeting presentation cannot be run (maybe it
is just a daily meeting), then it should try to open a daily meeting presentation file.
On the other hand, r6 says that if it is a daily meeting, enable the following rule:
Message On⇒INT trunOnPro jector⊗openDMPresentation⊗openWMPresentation
This rule sasys that, in this context, opening a daily meeting presentation file
(openDMPresentation) has higher priority than opening a weekly meeting presenta-
tion file (WMPresentation). With the given theory, the office agent will conclude+∂INT
openWMPresentation if it receives Message On because it is a weekly meeting and a
projector is already turned on. This example clearly illustrates how contextual informa-
tion is naturally represented within our reasoning model. That is, contextual information
can be used to enable certain rules and to change priority between deliberations.
5 Summary
We extended Defeasible Logic to deal with the contextual deliberation process of cog-
nitive agents. First, we introduce meta-rules to reason with rules. Meta-rules are rules
that have, as a consequent, rules to derive goals (obligations, intentions and desires): in
other words, meta-rules include nested rules. Second, we introduce explicit preferences
among rules. They deal with complex structures where nested rules can be involved to
capture scenarios where rules are violated. Further research are the development of a
methodology to use the language, and a formal analysis of the logic.
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